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The present document is an excerpt of an essay that I wrote as part of my
application material to graduate school in Computer Science (with a focus on
Artificial Intelligence), in 1986. I was not invited by any of the schools that
received it, so I became a theoretical physicist instead. The essay’s full title was
“Some Topics in Philosophy and Computer Science”. I am making this text
(unchanged from 1985, preserving the typesetting as much as possible) available
now in memory of Jerry Fodor, whose writings had influenced me significantly
at the time (even though I did not always agree).
The Illusion of Mind
At the very root of the mind-body problem lies our peculiar perception of what we gen-
erally call the mind: our ability to think, to have emotions, pain, motives, fear, to be or
not to be in a mood, or to have free will, to name only a few of the notions which occur
in the language-game of mind. The perception of this mind as being different from the
body has sparked a large number of competing theories of the mind. The present contro-
versy owes a great deal of its sharpness to the fact that Cartesian dualism was shown to
be unsustainable, and that materialistic descriptions are in some cases far from convinc-
ing. The transformation of the mind-body problem into a mind-brain problem has not
changed much on that. Furthermore, the easy escape seems to be barred: indeed, if ever
the mind could be shown to be some kind of computing-system, the mind-body problem
would instantaneously vanish: the interaction of hardware and software is of course well
understood. Unfortunately (and predictably) the attempts to supply machines-with-minds
has been as yet unsuccessful, and have drawn critics claiming their failure to be certain
out of almost every corner. Hence the statement that the easy escape seems to be barred.
It is my aim to argue that this line of thinking is far from being exhausted, and that after
it has been shown that in effect there are no obstacles as to adopting this view, the easy
escape remains far from easy.
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First I want to concentrate on what seems to be inherent to virtually every theory of
mind, which I call the “Cartesian Premise”.
In part IV of his “Discourse on Method”, Descartes establishes the following 1
(1) I cannot possibly doubt that I exist as a thinking thing.
(2) I can doubt, however, that I have a body, and thus that I exist as a physical
thing
(1) is interpreted as “One knows for sure that one has a mind, that one is a thinking
thing” by Flanagan. He calls this interpretation “Simple Cartesianism” as opposed to
“Content Cartesianism”, “Causal Cartesianism”, and “Process Cartesianism”.2 I shall
adopt the interpretation of Simple Cartesianism. The question that immediately arises is
the following: How does one know for sure that one has a mind? I can agree with the
statement that one knows that one is a thinking thing, if that mans that one notices that
one thinks. I’ll agree that one has the impression of having a mind, too. But does the
impression of having a mind allow you to infer actually having one? Yes, but only in the
case that mind is effectively identified with “having the impression of having a mind”.
There is no way we can rule out the possibility that we actually are subject to the illusion
of having a mind. The extension of the perspective to the mind nevertheless introduces
a highly non-trivial complication: If we are said to have the illusion of mind, then this
illusion has to be an illusion somewhere. It seems as if the only place where we can have
illusions is the mind itself! It is however no surprise that we arrive to this kind of self-
reference. Indeed, our perception of the mind mainly stems from autointrospection, that
is our impression of the mind is our impression of our own mind. Hence the process of
autointrospection is intrinsically self-referential. So we seem to arrive at the conclusion
that an impression of mind is only possible when we presuppose a mind, or else we shall
have to believe that we can have illusions in illusions. I shall however propose another way
to cope with the illusion of mind. Before setting the stage for this task, I want to come
back briefly to the Cartesian Premise.
I hope that I have convinced the reader that one can doubt that one has a mind, that
it is conceivable that what we call our mind is only an illusion. To follow Wittgenstein
however, one cannot reasonably doubt that one has a body.3 One may argue that all we
can have is the impression of having a body, still, to have the impression of intelligence
or to have the impression of mind is qualitatively different from having the impression of
a body: nobody can touch or see intelligence or mind, therefore the distinction between
“having a body” and “having the impression of having a body” may (on that level) not be
called metaphysical. This would mean that the Cartesian Premise has to be modified. It
should now read:
1Points (1) and (2) are adapted from Flanagan (1984), p. 12
2Flanagan (1984) p. 193.
3Wittgenstein (1969)
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1. One cannot reasonably doubt that one has a body.
2. One cannot doubt that one has the impression of having a mind.
I feel I must admit that the original Cartesian Premise was much more poetic.
Before I can turn to the consequences the modification of the Cartesian Premise has on
the possibility of AI, I still have to point out how it may be possible to have the illusion of
having a mind.
The aim of Part I was to uncover the metaphysical nature of the distinction between
real mind and the illusion of mind. For this discovery to have any relevance however, the
possibility of the illusion of mind still has to be proved. A convincing proof should in
my opinion consist in showing that the propositional attitude of having-the-impression-of-
having-a-mind fits into the general description of the mind without leading to inconsisten-
cies. Such descriptions of minds are in general attempts to explain how the mind works
without making use of the vocabulary of psychology. Since I shall make no exception to
this and since the methodology of reducing a science is a highly intricate problem, I shall
outline a framework of reduction that allows me to demonstrate the relevance and validity
of the process I will outline subsequently. The basic problems with reduction were already
pointed out in Jerry Fodor’s essay “Computation and Reduction”.4 I shall “rederive” some
of his results in my framework and then use the developed terminology for “proving” the
relevance of the reduction of Psychology to Computer Science.
It may seem at times that the machinery I shall develop to this end is a bit like deploying
an artillery to kill a fly. Nevertheless although the exposition of the framework of reduction
might be slightly laborious, we shall be rewarded with a powerful terminology. In addition
it seems to me that the fly I want to kill is only the tip of an iceberg, and that no less than
the arguments developed will do.
On Reduction
Reduction of the sentences xi of a theory T1 to sentences yi of theory T0 consists mainly in
stating a number of relations between the systems of sentences, and in that effect creating
substitution rules. However, a number of constraints have to be applied on this relation,
in order for the reduction to meet our intuitive conception of what reduction should be
like. The concept seems to be modeled on the cases of successful reduction in the history of
science. Some paradigms are the reduction of Chemistry to Electrodynamics and Quantum
Mechanics, of Celestial Mechanics to the theory of Gravity, or, in a very recent and from the
point of view of reduction highly interesting case, the reduction of the theory of elementary
particles to so-called String-theory, as well as the reduction of Gravity to String–theory.5
It will in this context turn out to be more interesting to study cases where reduction has
4Fodor (1981b)
5for a review see Physics Today, July 1985 p. 17
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not been that successful, like this seems to be the case with the reduction of Computational
Psychology6 to Neurology.
Let xi be the sentences of a theory T1, yi the sentences of a theory T0. I shall subse-
quently write xi ∈ T1; yi ∈ T0.
The sentences x are built from the vocabulary V1, elements of the vocabulary V1 shall
be called Ai; the sentences y are built from the vocabulary V0, Bi ∈ V0.
xi =
N1∑
j=1
cijAj i = 1, ..., n1 (1)
yi =
N0∑
j=1
cijBj i = 1, ..., n0 (2)
The vocabulary forms the basis of the theory, whereas the “words” linking the elements
of the vocabulary, the cij , are the same for both theories. It should be noted that the
expressions (1) and (2) should not be taken too literally. The essence is, that sentences
in a theory are some sort of “linear combination” of elements of the vocabulary. Not all
possible combinations though are in effect sentences of the theory.
I shall now proceed with a number of definitions:
Def. 1:
A Reduction R is the set of all functions fi, such that
yi = f(x1, ..., xn1) yi ∈ T0, xi ∈ T1, i = 1, ..., n0 (3)
The set of all functions fi (sometimes called bridge laws) effectively reduces T1 to T0. I
shall call T1 the reduced and T0 the reducing theory. I shall also call the set of all xi the
domain of f : D(f), and the set of all y = f(x) the range of f ; R(f). It seems obvious that
R(f) is a subset of T0: R(f) ⊂ T0.
Let me now introduce some basic notions and definitions of Algebra to study the prop-
erties of f :7
Def. 2:
A relation f is called a map, if:
for every xi ∈ D(f) there is a y ∈ R(f) such that y = f(x), and
f(xi) 6= f(xj)⇒ xi 6= xj .
This means that for a function to be a map every element from D(f) must be mapped
to exactly one element of R(f). I shall give an example for illustration:
6Computational psychology proposes “computational” accounts for mental processes. It has explanatory
power by being able to explain the content of mental states through inference.
7see for example Lang (1970) p. 83ff
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T1 T0f
f
f is not a map
Def. 3:
A mapping is called one-to-one (injective) if:
For every xi ∈ D(f) and for every f(xi) ∈ R(f) : f(xi) = f(xj)⇒ xi = xj .
This states that if a map is one-to-one, no two elements in D(f) are mapped onto one
element of R(f).
Example:
T1 T0f
f
f is not one-to-one
Def. 4:
A map f is said to be onto (surjective), if:
For every y ∈ R(f) there exists an x ∈ D(f) such that: y = f(x). The meaning of this
definition is obvious.
Def. 5:
A map being simultaneously onto and one-to-one is called bijective.
Intuitively, a Reduction has to satisfy the following conditions:
- every element of T1 must have exactly one image in T0;
- there must be elements of T0 which have no correspondent in T1.
These requirements can now be stated for the Reduction R, which is the set of all functions
fi:
8
8It is important to notice that these requirements do not apply to the functions linking the vocabularies,
since it is crucial here that any fi may take more than one argument (see 4b). If the fi would take only
one argument. the properties of f would carry through to the functions linking the vocabularies. Such a
5
- R must be a map (4a)
- R may or may not be one-to-one (4b)
- R may not be onto. (4c)
I shall now give some definitions which closely follow Fodor:9
Def. 6:
A generalization gi from the set of generalizations G is a statement about an event. I
shall call g a generalization of T if it is expressed in the vocabulary V but is not a sentence
of T :
gi =
∑
j
cijVj , Vj ∈ V
Def. 7:
A generalization is set to be explained in T1, if there exists exactly one finite subset of
sentences T1 from which generalizations g may be inferred. This fact shall be denoted by
g =
n˜∏
j=1
xj n˜ ≤ n1 (5)
I shall give an example as illustration:
Let x1 = “All elephants are gray”
x2 = “Clyde is an elephant”
Then the generalization g = “Clyde is gray” may be written as
g = x1 ⊗ x2 =
2∏
i=1
xi
The symbol
∏
abbreviated the multiple use of ⊗, which simply denotes the logical
connection of x1 and x2.
10
If g =
∏2
i=1 xi and x1.x2 ∈ T!, then g is said to be explained in T1.
relation is typically given by:
Ai = r
(1)(Bi) Ai ∈ V1, Bi ∈ V0
Bi = r
(0)(Ai)
and f(xj) = f(
∑N−1
k=1 cjkAk) =
∑
k=1 cjkf(Ak) =
∑N1
k=1 cjkBk = yj ⇒ r(0) = f
9Fodor (1981b) p. 150ff
10The nature of the connection as well as the domain of g may be specified. A formulation including
these features is in preparation.
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A generalization may of course have explanations in different theories, e.g., there may
be xi ∈ T1 and yi ∈ T0 such that:
g =
m∏
i=1
yi =
e∏
j=1
xj .
The sets xi and yj may then be viewed as different bases to the set of all generalizations,
G.
From this point of view a Reduction is nothing but a change of basis for G.
Def. 8:
A generalization g ∈ G is called nomologically necessary in T if it has an explanation
in T , that is:
g =
∏
j
xj , xj ∈ T . (6)
Def. 9:
A theory T is said to possess explanatory power if the generalizations of G in T have
explanations is T , ie.:
For every gi ∈ G with gi =
∑
ij cijAj : g =
∏n
i=1 xi .
From definitions 8 and 9 it may be inferred that:
A theory T has explanatory power if the generalizations of G in T are nomologically
necessary.
Therefore, if T1 possesses explanatory power, the reduced theory T0 will necessarily
have explanatory power if the Reduction preserves nomological necessity.11
Def. 10:
If a generalization g may be expressed either in the vocabulary V1 or in the vocabulary
V0, the substitution rules
Ai = r
(1)
i (B1, ..., Bn0)
Bj = r
(0)
j (A1, ..., An1)
define the standard Reduction of T1 to T0.
11I am not sure whether one may replace the “if” in definitions 8 and 9 by an “if-and-only-if” ≡ “iff”,
that is, whether the conditions are not only necessary but also sufficient. The question is whether such a
definition is sensible.
7
Def. 11:
A standard Reduction which preserves nomological necessity is called a strong Reduc-
tion.
A Reduction R preserves nomological necessity iff:
For every g ∈ G there are fj ∈ R such that:∏m
j=1 yj =
∏m
j=1 fj(x1, ..., xn1) = g, provided that g =
∏n
i=1 xi.
Since one is only interested in reduction schemes where the reduced science necessarily
possesses explanatory power, we now have to investigate under what circumstances the
Reduction preserves nomological necessity.
For that matter, consider the following diagram:
T0T1
T1G(   ) T0G(   )
R∼
∼EE
R
Here I have called E the map which effectively links generalizations of G in T1 to
sentences of T1. Since there may be only one subset of T1 from which g may be derived
(explained), E has to be bijective.12
We can now state that R preserves nomological necessity iff the diagram commutes,
that is, if there is an unambiguous way to construct E˜ (the nomological necessity of G in
T0).
Now we have seen that R is a map, but it is not bijective, whereas E is bijective
(a generalization g must have at least one and not more than one explanation in T0). An
explanation E˜ of g in T0 must of course be bijective also. For this to be the case, however, it
is a necessary condition that R˜ must be bijective.13 If not, E˜ will be ambiguous, hence not
bijective. This means that no two (or more) generalizations of g in T1 may be mapped onto
a generalization of g in T0. This phenomenon however seems to occur when for instance
12This link is mediated by a set called the product set of T : P (T ), the elements of which are all pos-
sible combinations of elements of T . This set is the domain of g. This more elaborate formulation is in
preparation.
13Since R is not bijective, this is not a sufficient condition. With a few assumptions however one can find
sufficient conditions. Since these are not needed here I shall not elaborate on them.
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computational psychology is reduced to neurology. The origin of this is the occurrence of
“fusion”.14
I shall briefly (and sloppily) illustrate fusion:
As in the previous example, let
x1 = “All elephants are gray”
x2 = “Clyde is an elephant”
Since there is a relation of content between x1 and x2 one may “infer” the generalization
g = x1 ⊗ x2, that is g =“Clyde is gray” is explained in T1. If now the reduction does not
pay attention to content, fusion is likely to occur:
If, for instance:
y1 = f1(x1, x2) =“apple”
y2 = f2(x1, x2) =“happy”
the generalization “Clyde is gray” although having a generalization in T0 will not be nomo-
logically necessary in T0 (i.e. have an explanation in T0), since due to the Reduction
{f1, f2}, several generalizations of g in T1 will be translated to one generalization in T0.
What has been distinguishing these generalizations in T1 has been lost in the process
of Reduction. I shall call generalizations which are the image of several generalizations
degenerated. I should perhaps emphasize that the term “fusion” does not refer to the gen-
eralizations but to the sentences of T0: it is obvious that the above Reduction does not
preserve syntax and only assigns “variables” to the new sentences. Such an assignment
does not contain any “pointers” in order to have content. The term “fusion” refers to the
reduction R which fuses expressions of T1 in T0.
Let me now draw the final conclusions of this section which are very similar to Fodor’s
although the vocabulary I use has been defined much more rigorously.
For a reduction to preserve explanatory power it has to preserve nomological necessity.
If fusion occurs, one necessary condition for the Reduction to preserve nomological necessity
cannot be met.
With these facts in mind, a cursory look at the reduction of computational psychology
to neurology shows that the reducing science will not have the explanatory power of the
reduced science, since in the translated sentences, like “John is in the mental state XYZ”
or “Susan is in mental state ABC”, any hint of content has been lost. These sentences are
in effect typically fused expressions, since they contain no referring terms. If psychological
14For a more detailed exposition of fusion, see Fodor (1981b) p. 158ff and references therein.
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statements are actually representations of content, them the requirement is that this con-
tent has to be represented in the reducing science too. I shall now come to the main point
of this section.
Although it seems as if the failure of strong Reduction in the computational psychol-
ogy/neurology case stems from the peculiarity of psychology and its sentences, I shall argue
that this is not so. In fact there already exists a system T0 which effectively reduces com-
putational psychology: it is the predicate calculus. Moreover, the predicate calculus is
easily translatable into computer-intelligible languages, such as LISP.
Meaning and Content in the Predicate Calculus: How to have Illusions
in Illusions
I shall not be giving a detailed description of the predicate calculus and its applications,
since its use is well-known, and much more competent people than I have described and
used it at length.15 I shall however give a few striking examples in order to show how
the representations of mental states may be related in virtue of their content, and how
propositional attitudes fir into the scheme of predicate calculus. Although the predicate
calculus may in principle handle sentences on qualitative states (like feelings, emotions,
etc.), since there is no psychology of qualitative states I shall give no attention to them.
As a consequence I shall concentrate only on the representation of the content of propo-
sitional attitudes in the predicate calculus and have a look at the structure of the semantical
network. For AI-researchers though this section will rather be on the trivial side.
For convenience I shall give a very short introduction to the predicate calculus, which
I have adapted from Charniak, McDermott (1985).
An atomic formula in the predicate calculus is written in the form:
(predicate-terms-)
as e.g., in
(loves John Mary)
(is-gray elephant)
(inst block-1 prism)
The value of such a bracket is either true or false. They may be connected via the
connectives and, or, not and if, as in:
(and (color block-1 yellow)
(inst block-1 elephant))
15see for example Charniak (1985)
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which states that block-1 is a yellow elephant.
There are two kinds of quantifiers in the predicate calculus: the existential and the
universal quantifiers.
x is a universally quantified variable in formula f with:
(forall(x) f).
The variable x is existentially quantified with:
(exists(x) f).
Example:
(forall (z) (if (inst z elephant)(color z gray))) (3.1)
expresses the rule that all elephants are gray.
Given the last formula, it is possible to infer (color Clyde gray) from the assertion (inst
Clyde elephant).
Expression (3.1) is in fact a representation of the belief that elephants are gray. It is in
this form that the facts which the computer “currently” believes are represented. I shall
describe in some detail what happens when the computer is asked a simple question, for
instance whether the color of Clyde is gray. The main features of the computer which are
relevant to us now are the data-base (or fact-base) and the inference-engine. The inference-
engine is a device which is in possession of inference-rules like (3.1) and accomplishes several
tasks, a few of which shall be mentioned subsequently. The data-base on the other hand
is crammed with assertions like: (has-part elephant trunk) or: (is-hungry Fred) etc. The
inference-engine translates the question into the internal representation (which in this case
is the predicate calculus). It then comes up with the command
(Show (color Clyde Gray)).
It then searches through the data-base in order to prove the “theorem”: (color Clyde
gray)). Since it is in possession of rule (3.1), it will immediately come up with (color Clyde
gray), the moment it has found the assertion (inst Clyde elephant). In this case, the new
fact that (color Clyde gray) may be added to the data-base. The process just described
is called “backward-chaining”, since deductions are only carried out if required. There is
also another possibility called “forward-chaining”, where the inference engine infers all the
assertions it can “think” of (given the items in the data-base and the rules in the inference-
engine). In response to a query the engine searches through the data-base in order to
match the query.
I have been describing this example in some detail to point out just how a relation
between generalizations is realized in the predicate calculus. (In order to be brief I have of
11
course been dramatically oversimplifying). Nevertheless it turns out that in effect sentences
are pointing to each other in virtue of the “beliefs” held by the inference engine. The notion
of “chaining” illustrates this quite remarkably. The set of all rules available to the inference-
engine links sentences of the data-base into structures like trees and possibly loops. This is
what is sometimes called a semantical network, semantical because the structure stems from
relations of content. Now it should be emphasized that the computer, more specifically
the inference-engine, has no clue as to what the meaning is of the symbols it is operating
upon, incidentally for the machine the sentences are completely devoid of any content.
How this may be possible while we have seen that some sort of content has to be there
in order to achieve relations, is in fact straightforward: we are now on a different level of
description16 than in psychology, and the vocabulary “meaning” and “content” is of no
use on this level. On the level of the predicate calculus the meaning of a sentence is the
background of the semantical network to which it is “wired”. Let me illustrate this with
some Wittgensteinian ideas:
In the Wittgensteinian view of philosophy, words are devoid of intrinsic meaning, they
acquire their meaning in the background of the possible contexts in which they may be used,
that is, the meaning of a word is defined through the way it might be connected to other
words. Just how they may be connected is stipulated by rules to which we abide, the rules
of the language-game. The fact that nevertheless we understand each other is a remnant
of our learning a language by rule-following. While as a consequence the conceptions we
have formed of a word are quite similar, the meaning of a word is an intrinsically private
matter, indeed one can say that no two persons have exactly the same conception of the
meaning of a word, since the ways in which a word is liable to be used depends on the past
(verbal or nonverbal) experiences of a person, and these may not be equal.
It is exactly this way that I understand the meaning of sentences of the predicate
calculus. On the level of the machine only, the sentences have no meaning at all. They
acquire it by the way they may be connected to other sentences present in the data-base.
The rules that specify just how to connect them are nothing else than the beliefs held by
the inference-engine. Since the structure of the semantical network depends on the facts
it contains (remember that any fact inferred as a response to a query may be added to
the data-base), the meaning of a sentence (defined as above) may be different for different
data-bases.17 But on the other hand, due to the fact that the rules of the inference-engine
are on a strictly logical basis, the meaning of a sentence like (color Clyde reduce gray)
will be quite similar for different data-bases. Let me sum it all up: if a computer is
given the possibility to shape its own “personal” data-base thus creating its “past”, such a
computer should be able to produce a near-perfect impression of mind! One last thing that
I have promised: there may be in the endless depths of a data-base an innocent-looking
16I borrowed this term from Hofstadter (1979)
17The resemblance of the semantical network to neural networks and of the deduction methods like
chaining, in the background of the predicate calculus and in neurology, are of course purely coincidental. I
shall have nothing to say on neurology.
12
sentence of the form: (have-impression-of mind). This is how the propositional attitude of
having-the-impression-of-having-a-mind fits into a theory of the mind without leading to
inconsistencies.
In closing this section, let me briefly comment on an argument brought against this
construction by Fodor18. I understand his criticism as claiming that:
(a) the representation of meaning in a computer language, and the theory of meaning
associated with sentences in a computer language (called procedural semantics) is no se-
mantic theory at all, since it does not account for the relation between language and the
world.
(b) procedural semantics is a form of verificationism and verificationism is highly im-
plausible. Furthermore it is verificationism that connects language and mind in procedural
semantics, thus casting doubt on that connection.
The refutation of these arguments will in fact be purely Wittgensteinian. Sentences
of ordinary language have exactly the same relation to the world as have the sentences of
predicate calculus. On the level of the sentences alone (that is, disconnected from their
environment, the semantical network), the sentences are entirely meaningless. For example,
the sentence “Boise is a city” creates the illusion of meaningfulness because of the fact that
we are unable to disconnect it from its network due to our knowledge of English. On the
level of the sentences alone, however, the combination of letters “Boise” is not referring at
all, it is in fact only on the level of the semantical network that Boise refers to a city in
Idaho. The same goes for the expression (city Boise).
The way in which a relation between the meaning of a word in ordinary language and
an object in the world is established is quite straightforward: it is established through
the process of learning a language. In a language we have a word (say: “book”), and its
meaning is given by the ways in which it may be used in different contexts. The relation
of the word to an object standing on some shelf, say, has been established by a person
pointing to the object and saying the word. The relation is thus created by the process
of training in the course of learning a language. This does not mean that sentences of
the language may be mapped onto states of the world, since sentences standing alone do
not mean anything. It thus follows, that although sentences of the predicate calculus have
truth values, nothing is implied on the states of the world, since the respective notions of
truth have nothing to do with each other, being defined on completely disjunct systems.
To put it more bluntly: Although (loves John Mary) has a truth value in the predicate
calculus, nothing is asserted on the relationship of two people named John and Mary, and
yet the sentence (loves John Mary) is meaningful on the level of the semantic network of
the predicate calculus. This takes care of the objection concerning verificationism. It is
true that on the level of the machine language the structure of the semantical network
is lost, and the translated sentences turn meaningless. However, we are not interested in
anything on that level. Indeed, machine language is a level of description with typically
18Fodor (1981c)
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“degenerated generalizations”, to use the vocabulary of the framework of reduction. But
semantical poverty of machine language is not associated with semantical poverty of the
higher-level language, as can be seen from the semantical power of the predicate calculus.
Conclusion
In this conclusion I shall try to sketch the main line I have been pursuing in the previous
section, and subsequently say a few words on the consequences of the structure I have been
outlining.
I have been emphasizing the metaphysical nature of the distinction between real and
artificial intelligence and arguing that the only notion that is accessible to us is the im-
pression of intelligence. This was to prepare the ground for discussing this same aspect
with respect to the mind. It turned out that in order for the notion of impression of mind
to have a meaning one has to be able to demonstrate the possibility of such an impression
in an appropriate model of the mind such that the self-referential “having illusions in illu-
sions” does not lead to paradoxes. Since such a theory of the mind is in general the result
of an attempt at reducing psychology, the validity of the procedure, or put in another
way, the relevance of the result, has to be investigated for every candidate for a reducer
of psychology. As it turns out, the reduction of psychology to computer science, more
specifically to the predicate calculus, is satisfactory and sensible, and per constructionem
enables one to cope with “illusions in illusions” in a very simple and straightforward way:
the propositional attitude of having-the-impression-of having-a-mind is represented as a
sentence of the data-base (or, incidentally, as a belief held by the inference-engine). Since
this seems like a rather cheap trick, I want to say a few words on the importance of this
construction.
Indeed I think that the fact of having information on the data-base stored in the data-
base is a far cry from being trivial. I would rather suggest that this feature is one of the
essences of our impression of having a mind, in that it is this kind of self-reflective sentences
that, (together with another important point to which I shall come soon) convince us that
we are dealing with a person, a mind, or whatever have you. What is equally important
is the fact that we may provide the computing-system with an additional feature such
that these sentences may emerge in the data-base without having been explicitly keyed
in. This device is tentatively baptized a “self-watcher”19 and should perform the task
of keeping a record of the sentences and the structure of the data-base, and of every
information available concerning the data-base itself. When this information is stored away
in sentences of the predicate calculus in the data-base itself, the fact that the inference-
engine has access to these sentences should produce a curious meshing of sentences on the
world with sentences on the data-base which may result in sentences claiming a certain
sort of self-awareness. It therefore seems as if the ability of self-reference is indeed the key
19I have borrowed this term from Hofstadter (1985).
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to the generation of the impression of mind; that consciousness may be nothing but an
artifact of a device being able to keep a record of the state of the data-base.
As advertised I want to mention another important thing that plays a crucial role in the
impression of mind. It is the observation that people tend to associate intelligent behavior
with life in a way that makes it difficult for them to believe that a “dead object” like a
computer may be in a position to produce such a behavior. That this is by no means a
trivial point is illustrated by the fact that this has been a major objection to the possibility
of AI, namely the claim that mind is intrinsically linked to life, and that a computer is by
construction dead and thus as a consequence unable to have a mind (that is, to give the
impression of mind).
I want to argue against this point by making use of the change of perspective that is
at the root of this essay. Since I have been emphasizing this perspective twice already, I
guess that I may be brief on that point.
The criterion for what constitutes the essence of life should be the impression of life,
there should be no metaphysical distinction between living and dead. Let me illustrate
this by the following. When an allegedly living creature is viewed from different levels of
description, one notices that if one goes down subsequent levels, say from the body to the
parts of the body, to the organs, the cells, the cell organelles, the molecules, the atoms,
and eventually to the elementary particles, what we generally call life suddenly disappears.
What then, in the light of this fact, may be the essence of life? Surely nothing metaphysical,
since this should then be present at every level.20 What may change is the impression of
life at different levels due to the emergence of collective phenomena, the origin of which
lie in the dynamics of the objects present at the underlying levels to which one has no
access at the level of the collective phenomena. No object should therefore be treated as
either alive or dead, since these are no global categories. They have been promoted to
global categories in ordinary language, which gave rise to such concepts as the soul, which
then plays the role of the metaphysical distinction between living and dead. This in turn
triggers problems like what happens to the soul when the creature eventually dies. The
moment one drops the metaphysical distinction between life and death such problems are
absent since it is conceivable that a system stops to give the impression of life.
This perspective obviously takes care of the objection mentioned earlier in that it
makes no sense to say that a computer is not alive. All one can say is that it fails to
give the impression of life, but that may be changed with the advent of more and more
clever programs, and is not an insurmountable barrier. Maybe one should start with
systems whose data-bases may not be erased, in that effect allowing the system to shape
its“personal” data-base thus effectively shaping its “language-game” .
It is hardly conceivable that this is what Wittgenstein had in mind when he used
“language-game” and “form-of-life” synonymously, but the view I have developed in this
20It is hardly conceivable that a metaphysical quality only pertains to sone arrangement of objects and
not to the objects themselves, or put in a fancier way: a metaphysical quality is a metaphysical quality.
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essay at least gives some hint on how it was possible that his way of putting things so often
was superior to nonanalytical views of philosophy.
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